On Natural Law

The more I reflect on the issue of Natural Law, the less I can see it as a viable option. I see Natural Law as comprising of essentially the following:

If there is order in the world, then reason can understand it.

There is order in the world.

Reason understands order in the world.

If there is a moral order, then it must be discoverable in the world.

There is a moral order.

There is a moral order discoverable in the world.

Therefore, reason understands a moral order in the world.

Any formulation of Natural Law resides on the above formulation in some way.

I think Locke is actually an excellent example to use, in this case. Locke believed that the role of the intellect was to investigate the world, and to thereby gain a Platonic sort of wisdom whereby man was unleashed from the cave of ignorance and set free in the world of Liberalism. Civilizations that more closely aligned on this axis would readily be able to coexist. It was for this reason that the Mohammedans were tolerable in society, as they had courts of law, worked the land, and had civilization. While their beliefs were not Christian, they should be allowed as part of a society with tolerance.

What do we get on the other side of the spectrum in Locke, however? We see the primitive state as embodied by the Native American. These people did not take advantage of the land, nor did they have any real civilization, but were likened to 100 families. They had no government. They had no reason. These people were culpable to invasion so that the ones with demonstrated reason could utilize the land to its potential. Locke, as we know, highly influence the founding fathers, especially Jefferson.

When I think of Natural Law, this is one of the examples that comes to mind. Another more remote one is the case of Aquinas. Aquinas utilized the theory in proximity to the notion of original sin, and salvation. It was because the existence of God was self evident that man was required to believe in Him to be able to be saved, at least at a base level. This position was also common among the Maturidis. Anyway, for Aquinas man could come to a basic notion of what was right or wrong, and a belief in God. This is because of the order that God had imposed upon the world was one that man could decipher through reason. Man, however, is in a naturally sinful state, and therefore, unless man could come to a belief in God, he could not be saved. God therefore gives evidence of himself in the world, and can be discovered. This was because of God's loving nature.

More and more, this notion has become distasteful for me. I see some basic biases that are prevalent in this view that makes subjugation easy. We see similar situations occurring under different philosophical systems in the New World. We see the British, and the Americans by inheritance, as well as the French, to a lesser extent, taking over the inhabited lands of the Americas, and subjugating the Native via warfare. We also see the Spanish doing the the same in Central and South America. These two both represent Lockean and Aquinian Natural Law in action. In many ways Lockean is really just Aquinian Natural Law, just demystified. Regardless, it easily accounts for subjugation due to the other readily being identified as being deficient in some manner that the Liberal self has somehow latched onto. Modern Liberals merely believe that we should care for these wretched souls who cannot attain greatness on their own. Modern Conservatives are much more in line with the classical trend to subjugate, or at the very least ignore, those who are unable to attain this greatness. Both are sprouts of Lockean thought, Liberals just took from Marx.

I don't see this as being in line with Abrahamic thought. Instead, Ashari thought is that man is saved in virtue of his ignorance. Those of the Jahiliyya, or the Time of Ignorance, are saved. If one has not heard the message of God, then one is not held accountable for it. One need not even believe in God, as this is not something that is thought to be discoverable in the world. Indeed, a kafir, or a disbeliever, is one who covers up the truth. To cover up the truth one must first have known it. One is not deficient or ready for subjugation by virtue of not learning of Islam. Instead, one becomes responsible and duty bound by virtue of learning of Islam. Instead, we believe that Law is given by divine decree, and can be interpreted through reason. Thus, reason becomes subject to revelation. We therefore approach the world through the interpretive lens of revelation. Adab, or proper manners, are so stressed so as to eliminate the type of religious extremism we see. What is the first thing that the criminals do? They get rid of tasawwuf. They get rid of the spiritual core of Islam. This is the only way they can manipulate it, and allow for the type of religious extremism that they display. Only the outward matters to them, while the inside is a hollow shell. So, we aren't to take our having the revelation to reflect positively on us, rather the Qur'an paints a fairly poor light on those who have received revelation before, and even informs the Muslims that we will be replace with those better than us if we cannot fulfil it.

Now, this is a fine theological thought, but let's give some philosophical backing. Firstly, lets take what we actually observe in nature.  Do we actually observe a moral order?  Can we say that the killing of a gazelle by a lion has any moral quality?  I would say not.  Do we see any moral quality in the rape of a female duck by the male?  I would say not.  Nor can we say that there are any moral qualities in things of lower orders.  Rather, it is only with man that we get a sense of morality.  In fact, the deeper we dive, the less moral anything seems.  What morality is there in quantum physics?  I doubt as though there is even any room for it.  Instead, what we see is a science that only explicates how things are, and give no qualitative judgments at all.  Now, I'm not saying this is a bad thing at all, rather it can be a quite good thing.  You have people like Sam Harris who wants to attempt to derive a should from an is, but fail to make the leap.  The more scientific we become, the less we see as having any moral component whatsoever.  Now, why is this?  As we saw above, part of Natural Law is that for there to be a moral order that we understand, it must reside in the world.  But we have no scientific measure of morality whatsoever, and this is not a hurdle I think anyone is prepared to make.

Now, if there is no moral order in the world for us to discover, then why is it that we have a sense of morality?  Why do we see things as moral?  First, I must state that I am assuming that we have a faculty that is able to make moral judgments, which I will call conscience.  Like any faculty, this can be missing in some, or better or worse in others.  However, with all faculties, the moral faculty should have an object.  Sight has light, hearing has sound, and conscience has morality.  If moral order is not found in the world, and conscience has an object, then moral order must be found elsewhere.  This can be seen in Plato's Euthyphro.  The two classical horns arise not because there is an issue with divine command theory, but because there is a problem with divines commands theory.  As is pointed out, if piety is what the gods love, then we can never come to more than what more of the gods love than others, and this isn't much of an answer.  It appears that piety is capricious.  On the other hand, if piety is separate from divinity, then why appeal to divinity at all?  However, Plato gives it away at the end when Socrates tells Euthyphro that they almost had what piety was, but turned away from it.  We can see what Plato's answer was more fully in his theory of forms, and his ultimate form of the Good.  It was from the Good that all moral judgments originated.  Why is it that he felt that the Good was a reasonable source of morality?  The reason for this is that it is only from a single source that one can find a grounding in morality.  If there is more than a single source, then there is no moral order, only ethical systems.  Every ethical system would be equal in virtue of their being instead of being more or less closely related to the moral order.  There would only be a subjective right or wrong, and therefore no real right or wrong at all.  What is right within one ethical system would be wrong in another, and no judgment can be made between them.

If, instead, an ethical system only gains validity by being more in line with the form of the good, then the one that comes from the single source most perfectly would be the best system to follow.  To decide this particular fact, we must make decisions based upon the best available evidence.  And based upon the evidences available, which include historical, scientific, and logical, I find Islam to be the most perfect.

Now, if we are to take our ethical system as one contingent upon revelation, then what can we say of those who follow other ethical systems?  Can we call them good or bad?  Can we judge upon them at all?  It appears that this is not the case from what has been said above.  After all, if we are incapable of discovering the moral order without revelation, then those who are without revelation are merely constructing objects for their faculties, and making the best judgment they can.  Within Islam, a scholar who makes a correct judgment receives two rewards, whereas the scholar who makes an incorrect judgment receives one reward.  How would we not see non-Muslims any differently?  This also becomes evident as the practice of the Khulifa Rashidun when we look at the historical record.  We see that there were not mass conversions, but rather the locals were left untouched, and to their own.  Furthermore, we have already seen that those who have not received revelation are considered exempt according to Islamic creed.  

It is in this way that Natural Law as it has been formulated fails us.  Natural Law is inherently biased toward exclusivity.  This is something I find unacceptable with a foundation for any ethical system. The most that we can hope for without revelation is a form of ethics that comes out to be self-serving in some manner, as the only thing that can be relied upon is the aversion of pain, and the acceptance of pleasure, which utilitarians have touched on most acutely.